

18 OCT 1972

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TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
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TRENDS

in Communist Propaganda

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
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TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 9 - 15 OCTOBER 1972

Moscow (2547 items)

Indochina	(6%)	10%
[Vietnam	(6%)	8%]
Shah of Iran in USSR	(--)	5%
China	(4%)	4%
October Revolution	(--)	3%
Anniversary		
GDR-India Diplomatic	(--)	3%
Relations		

Peking (1501 items)

Domestic Issues	(57%)	36%
Indochina	(4%)	20%
[Laos Independence	(--)	9%]
Anniversary		
[Vietnam	(1%)	6%]
FRG Prime Minister	(--)	12%
Scheel in PRC		
UNGA Session	(15%)	8%

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

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INDOCHINA

Despite continued widespread speculation in the West that private U.S.-DRV negotiations on Vietnam have reached a more serious stage, Hanoi and Front propagandists have continued to picture the situation in standard, stereotyped terms. Thus, President Nixon is charged with being intent on pursuing the war while paying lip service to peace and with blocking a settlement based on the PRG's call for a tripartite provisional government by his continued "maintenance" of the Thieu regime. Ridiculing the notion that there are differences between Thieu and the Administration, Hanoi claims that the President is trying to create the false impression that the United States wants to reach a settlement but has met opposition from Thieu.

Hanoi has typically remained silent on the private talks in Paris and thus did not report Le Duc Tho's remark to reporters that "difficulties" remain. In reporting Tho's return to Hanoi on 16 October after his latest round of talks with Kissinger, DRV media noted cryptically that he had conferred en route with Soviet and Chinese leaders on "the military, political, and diplomatic aspects of the Vietnamese people's fight against U.S. aggression."

Attention to the military situation in South Vietnam is marked by reviews of the communists' alleged successes during the six months since their offensive was launched. And propaganda on U.S. air strikes against the DRV is highlighted by Hanoi's claim to have downed the 4,000th U.S. plane over Vinh Phu Province on 17 October.

Peking and Moscow both sustain their careful balance--on the one hand proffering support for the Vietnamese and on the other voicing restrained criticism of the United States. Peking endorsed the 11 October DRV Foreign Ministry protest over the strikes in Hanoi that day in a PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article on the 13th, and during Le Duc Tho's stopover Chou En-lai expressed "strong indignation" at U.S. bombing of Hanoi and other cities. During Tho's meeting in Moscow with Suslov and Katushev, the Soviet side also reportedly denounced U.S. bombing of the DRV. However, the October Revolution slogans did not repeat the specific demand for an end to the U.S. bombing which had been introduced in the May Day slogans.

HANOI, FRONT COMMENT ON SETTLEMENT ASSAILS PRESIDENT NIXON

Charges that the Nixon Administration is pursuing the war rather than seriously trying to reach a negotiated settlement are

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repeated for the most part in routine radio propaganda from Hanoi and the Front. Notably, there has been no recent comment on a political settlement in the party organ NHAN DAN,* but a 14 October article in the army paper QUAN DOI NHAN DAN again showed concern to counter speculation that there has been progress in negotiations.

The QUAN DOI NHAN DAN article quoted from President Thieu's speech on the 12th, in which he again rejected a coalition government, and observed that "people are curious" as to why Thieu delivered such a speech at a time "when Nixon, Rogers, and Laird have said that peace negotiations in Paris were progressing satisfactorily." Reporting that Thieu said peace must be achieved through military victories and that he threatened to kill all those who favor a three-segment government, the article commented that he would not dare oppose the United States on his own. It charged that President Nixon is using these "stubborn, war-maniacal, and fascist words" to create the false impression that the Administration wanted to reach a solution but had met opposition from Thieu. Elaborating, it added that "Nixon has repeatedly set up many smokescreens, announcing that peace was in the offing and sending Bunker and then Haig to meet Thieu to arrange for a coming cease-fire." The paper observed that further "exposure" of U.S. persistence in maintaining Thieu and in opposing a three-segment government had been accomplished by the communist representatives at the 12 October session of the Paris talks.

Even more stereotyped propaganda from Hanoi has included a radio commentary on the 16th which pictured President Nixon as "staggering" from the blows delivered during the six months of the offensive in South Vietnam as well as from the allegedly growing antiwar protest in the United States. It charged that the President has used "every maneuver" to influence the voters in the election campaign, including "moves designated to create the illusion that a settlement of the war is around the corner." The commentary went on to say that Senator McGovern has "exposed" the President "as one who is placing America's honor at dictator Nguyen Van Thieu's feet and shamelessly prolonging the longest, cruellest, and most tragic war in U.S. history." On the 12th, Hanoi radio had carried a detailed report of McGovern's TV speech outlining his Vietnam policy but had offered no comment.

* The President's 5 October press conference atypically had occasioned no comment in NHAN DAN. See the TRENDS of 12 October 1972, page 2.

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A Liberation Radio commentary on the 17th routinely dismissed what it called the month-long assertion by the Administration that it is unwilling to impose a government on South Vietnam as a "sophistic" argument against the PRG proposals, designed to cover up its intention of maintaining the Thieu regime and eliminating the PRG.

PUBLICATION OF TRINH'S
NATIONAL ASSEMBLY REPORT

Hanoi radio reported on 16 October that the Su That Publishing House had just released a book entitled "Our March Forward on the Diplomatic Front" which contains the text of Vice Premier--and Foreign Minister--Nguyen Duy Trinh's report to the second session of the National Assembly. The broadcast did not specify that the assembly session was held from 20 to 25 March. Hanoi radio had broadcast Trinh's report in installments on 30 and 31 March, and it was published in NHAN DAN on the 31st.* There appears to be no special significance in its publication in book form now, but the fact that Hanoi radio has called attention to the book may reflect the DRV's recently apparent concern to document negotiating positions. In reviewing communist initiatives since the Front's 10-point proposal of 8 May 1969, Trinh had noted that during 1971 the DRV had put forth its nine-point solution on 26 June and the PRG had introduced its seven-point proposal on 1 July. Trinh glossed over the fact that the DRV's nine points had been advanced in the secret talks with Kissinger, a fact first revealed by the President in his 25 January speech.

DRV ROUTINELY PROTESTS AIR STRIKES, CLAIMS 4,000TH PLANE

After weeks of propaganda calls to proceed to the new record of 4,000 U.S. planes downed, Hanoi announced that on 17 October the tally had reached 4,002 with the reported downing of an F-111 (the 4,000th) and two other planes that day. The two F-111 pilots, identified as Captains Hockridge James Alan and Graham Allen Upton in a VNA radipho to on the 18th, were reportedly killed when their plane was "blasted to pieces" northwest of Hanoi over Vinh Phu Province.

The standard propaganda fanfare celebrating the claimed feat of downing the 4,000th plane included a VPA High Command communique, released on the 18th, which lauded the Vinh Phu armed forces and people for scoring "an outstanding achievement" which was said to reflect the fact that "the U.S. imperialists can in no way reverse the war situation, which is favorable to us and unfavorable to

* Trinh's report is discussed in the TRENDS of 5 April 1972, pages 7-9.

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them." A QUAN DOI NHAN DAN Commentator article, broadcast by Hanoi radio on the 18th as part of a special program celebrating the downing, claimed that even though the Nixon Administration has given a "green light" to U.S. air and naval forces, the United States has "failed to avoid disastrous setbacks or to attain any strategic objective." The article insisted that the U.S. objective of using the air strikes to break the "will" of the Vietnamese people and force them to accept a settlement on U.S. terms has failed and will continue to fail.

**DAMAGE TO DIPLOMATIC
MISSIONS IN HANOI**

The DRV Foreign Ministry's 11 October protest over the bombing in Hanoi that day, during which the French and other diplomatic missions were damaged, was followed by a spate of lower-level propaganda deploring the action. Articles in NHAN DAN and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on the 13th, along with a Hanoi radio commentary on the 12th, denounced Secretary Laird for suggesting in his press conference on the 11th that the damage to the French mission may have been caused by a faulty SAM or other DRV fire. To further bolster the argument, VNA quoted French ambassador to Peking Etienne Manach as saying he was told by a Vietnamese expert when he visited the site that the damage could not have been caused by a SAM.

Roundups of foreign condemnation of the bombing have included the report that the resolution issued by the third conference of the International Committee for Investigating U.S. War Crimes in Indochina--held in Copenhagen from 10 to 16 October--condemned the 11 October attack as a link in the chain of U.S. "crimes" in Southeast Asia. A conference statement, among other things, called for a U.S. withdrawal from Thailand as well as from Indochina and U.S. payment of reparations* to the Indochinese, and these demands were noted in the 17 October NHAN DAN editorial on the Copenhagen meeting.

**OTHER PROPAGANDA
ON BOMBING**

The continuing, virtually daily protest by the DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman highlighted alleged continuing B-52 strikes in Nghe An, Ha Tinh, and Quang Binh provinces and the Vinh Linh zone. And a VNA item on the 15th claimed that during the period from 7 through 14 October the huge planes had dropped nearly 5,000

* Point four of the DRV's nine-point plan, advanced in the 1971 secret U.S.-DRV talks, calls for U.S. payment of reparation.

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bombs of heavily populated areas of Ha Tinh Province. The foreign ministry spokesman's statement on the 16th listed Vinh City and Viet Tri as among the targets hit by U.S. planes, together with the outskirts of Nam Dinh.

Other targets cited in the spokesman's statements include a salt water sluice in Tien Hai district of Thai Binh Province, reportedly hit on the 13th; a 30-meter section of dike on the Ninh Co River in Hai Hau district of Nam Ha, reportedly damaged on the 14th; and a church in Ninh Giang township, "the hospital" in Vinh City, and a junior middle school in a village in Ha Hoa district of Vinh Phu on the 15th. The effects of U.S. bombing on the civilian population were highlighted in reports on the 13th of a press conference sponsored jointly by the Vietnamese Commission for the Protection of Mothers and Children and the Vietnam Women's Union.

DRV, PRG LAUD ALLEGED SUCCESSES IN SIX-MONTH-OLD OFFENSIVE

Beginning on 13 October Hanoi and Front media review alleged communist successes in the first six months of their offensive in South Vietnam, claiming that 325,000 allied troops had been put out of action, 40 percent of them from main-force units. Reviews of the offensive at the beginning of September had claimed that a total of 250,000 troops had been wiped out.* Calling attention to the offensive's impact on the Vietnamization program, comment said that eight ARVN divisions and many lower-level units had been "wiped out or heavily decimated." The propaganda also claimed the capture or destruction of 6,300 military vehicles, including over 2,000 tanks and armored cars, 1,500 artillery pieces and mortars, and 45,000 guns of various calibers. It was also alleged that 2,050 aircraft had been shot down or destroyed on the ground. Continuing to promote the notion that the offensive was accompanied by widespread popular action, commentaries claimed that millions of people have risen up, "killed cruel agents, and destroyed the enemy's coercive machine," and that nearly 2.5 million people have seized control of "vast areas."

* For a discussion of this and earlier communist statistics on the fighting, see the 7 September 1972 TRENDS, pages 9-10.

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Editorials in the Hanoi press on the 14th reiterated the standard claim that the offensive has greatly altered the balance of forces. QUAN DOI NHAN DAN referred to the offensive as the "new summit" of the resistance and claimed that it had opened "new and more brilliant prospects" for the revolution and created a "sound basis on which to develop strongly the people's war in the regions and to produce a new strategic result."

CAPTURE OF BEN HET BASE The fall of the ARVN base of Ben Het (designated Plei Can by the communists) in Kontum Province on 12 October was hailed in a QUAN DOI NHAN DAN article on the 15th and a NHAN DAN editorial on the 17th. The communists claimed to have put out of action all the government forces at Ben Het and to have taken many prisoners and seized all weapons and materiel. The NHAN DAN editorial asserted that the communist victory at Ben Het "wiped out the enemy from the tricountry border area and created a large and solid base." It viewed the Ben Het action as further evidence of Hanoi's contention that the revolutionary forces are in an ascending and victorious position while the allies have an irreversible passive, descending, and defeated posture.

PEKING FETES LE DUC THO, CONDEMNS U.S. BOMBING OF HANOI

Le Duc Tho was given a warmer reception during his 15-16 October stop in Peking enroute home from Paris than during his four previous stopovers since June. Most notably, Chou En-lai for the first time since last April personally presided over the traditional banquet in Tho's honor. (Lower ranking PRC Politburo member Chang Chun-chiao had handled the banquet duties during Tho's stops on 17-18 June, 11-13 July, 18-19 August, and 8-9 September.) Also in contrast to recent practice, NCNA reported on remarks at the banquet, including Chou's routine pledge of "resolute support" for the Vietnamese struggle and expression of "very strong indignation" at the "outrageous crimes" of the United States in bombing Hanoi and other DRV cities. Tho reportedly gave an account of the "excellent situation" in the war and underlined Vietnamese determination to win greater victories on the "military, political, and diplomatic fronts."* Using stock formulations, NCNA stated

* The VNA account on the 16th reported Tho had "informed" the Chinese of the Vietnamese struggle against the United States "on the military, political, and diplomatic fields." VNA, but not NCNA, described the Chou-Tho meeting as taking place in "an atmosphere of intimacy among brothers"--the same formula used to

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that the two sides had a "very cordial and friendly conversation" at the banquet and reported that they repeatedly toasted Sino-Vietnamese friendship and unity.

DRV Vice Minister of Foreign Trade Ly Ban, who is in Peking to discuss the annual aid agreement, was listed as present at the banquet as well as the airport. NCNA also reported that the Soviet charge d'affaires was present at the airport to greet Tho on the 15th, marking the first time NCNA has noted a Soviet representative either seeing off or receiving a DRV negotiator in Peking since 13 July when the charge d'affaires was present as Tho left for Moscow on his way to Paris. As during Tho's last stopover, NCNA disclosed that on 15 October he had a "cordial and friendly" talk with Prince Sihanouk, who this time was accompanied by RGNUG Prime Minister Penn Nouth. (On 1 August 1971 Tho had also had a conversation with Penn Nouth; this was a month after the PRG's seven-point proposal had been released.)

BOMBING OF HANOI Though Chou En-lai did not specifically refer to the 11 October U.S. air raid on Hanoi in condemning U.S. bombing of DRV cities, it was denounced in a 13 October PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article. Entitled "The Vietnamese People Cannot Be Cowed By Bombing," the article voiced PRC support for the 11 October DRV Foreign Ministry statement on the bombing raid, expressed full confidence in Vietnamese determination to persist with the fight, and routinely derided U.S. bombing strategy against Vietnam.* Commentator pointed to the contradiction between U.S. bombing policy and professions of willingness to settle the war through negotiations. Nonetheless, it predictably sidestepped any criticism of the U.S. position in the negotiations and muted Chinese backing for the war effort.

Commentator said the wounding of the French and Albanian diplomats had caused the "greatest fury" from the people of the world. NCNA had earlier carried a report on the raid from its

* Peking last endorsed a DRV Foreign Ministry statement on U.S. bombing with authoritative comment in a 13 August PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial seconding the DRV Foreign Ministry statement on the 8th. However, Peking issued no seconding comment on the subsequent DRV Foreign Ministry statement of 17 August concerning U.S. bombing of Hanoi--the last such Vietnamese protest at this level prior to the 11 October statement.

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correspondent in Hanoi on the 11th and reported the next day that the PRC ambassador had personally extended his sympathies in calls on the French delegate general and the Albanian charge d'affaires, who were wounded during the raid, as well as during a visit to the Protocol Department of the DRV Foreign Ministry concerning Vietnamese casualties.

The Commentator article gave Peking's first authoritative backing for the appeal of DRV mayors concerning U.S. air attacks on Vietnamese cities which was released in Hanoi on 3 October. Peking followed this endorsement with a 17 October message from the municipal revolutionary committees of Peking and 28 other Chinese cities warmly responding to the DRV appeal and pledging support for the Vietnamese struggle.

MOSCOW ROUTINELY DEPLORES STRIKES, NOTES LE DUC THO STOPOVER

Moscow has continued to initiate little comment on Vietnam developments. Reports of Le Duc Tho's meeting with Suslov and Katushev during his stopover enroute from Paris to Hanoi noted that the Soviet side denounced U.S. bombing of Hanoi, but they did not refer explicitly to the 11 October raid in which the diplomatic quarter was hit. That bombing received no higher level protest than a statement, reported on the 12th, by the Soviet peace committee and Afro-Asian solidarity committee. On the 17th, TASS briefly reported several low-level Soviet protests against the "new barbarous raids" against Hanoi and other DRV towns, including a joint statement by the executive committees of several Soviet "hero cities." The reports do not indicate whether the Soviet statement is responsive to the 3 October DRV mayors' appeal; it reportedly merely condemned the "new crimes" committed by the American military, demanding "an immediate termination of all acts of war against the DRV and other countries of Indochina" and promising continued Soviet assistance and support.

Consistent with Moscow's relatively low-key attention to the bombing, the Soviet October Revolution slogan on the Vietnam war dropped the demand for an end to the U.S. bombing of the DRV, which had been introduced in the May Day slogans last spring.*

* The only other previous call for an end to the bombing in the slogans had been on May Day 1967, reflecting Soviet support at the time for the DRV's late-January "initiative" stating that an unconditional end to the air strikes could lead to U.S.-DRV talks.

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The current slogan demanded in the standard manner that the United States end the "barbaric war in Indochina" and withdraw its troops from South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. The conclusion to the slogan in previous years, "Hands off Indochina," omitted entirely last May Day, is now changed to "Freedom and peace to peoples of Indochina," a possible reflection of current negotiating activity.

BACKGROUND: The May Day slogans were released on 15 April--some 10 days after the U.S. resumption of full scale air strikes against the DRV but prior to the President's 8 May announcement of the mining of North Vietnamese ports. A 16 April TASS statement protesting strikes at Haiphong and Hanoi had echoed the slogans in calling for a halt to the bombing. But an 11 May USSR Government statement on the U.S. mining did not specify a bombing halt when it asked for a halt to U.S. "acts of aggression" and "cancellation of the blockade." Since then elite comment has generally avoided specific discussion of the air war in the DRV, although Foreign Minister Gromyko in his 26 September UNGA address quoted the passage of the PRG 11 September statement calling for an end to U.S. air strikes and other military action.

LE DUC THO STOPOVER Le Duc Tho's 13-14 October stopover in Moscow was his fifth such stop in as many months. He was received by Suslov and Katushev, who has customarily been on hand in the past. Suslov is the highest-ranking Soviet official Tho has seen since 1969, when he met Kosygin several times. The highest-ranking official to see Tho during his recent trips was Kirilenko. According to TASS the latest talks were held in "a fraternal, cordial atmosphere," the stock description. Following recent practice, Hanoi's coverage of Tho's trip consisted of a single VNA report on 16 October of his arrival home, taking note of his stopovers in Moscow and Peking. VNA described the talks in both capitals identically as taking place in an atmosphere of "intimacy among brothers."

As during the August and September Tho stopovers, some of the substance of the talks was reported. According to both Moscow and Hanoi, Tho told the Soviets about "the Vietnamese people's struggle against the U.S. aggression on the military, political, and diplomatic fronts," phraseology similar to that used in reporting his talks in August. But there was no indication that Tho thanked the Soviets for their aid and support, nor that the sides discussed "further developments of friendship and cooperation" as had been the case in August and September. The

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Soviet side this time emphasized its "firm and invariable policy" of giving "all-round assistance and support" but did not add the promise to continue doing so until "final victory" as it had done in the last two visits. Neither was there any indication that the Soviets expressed support for the DRV and PRG peace programs as they had done during Tho's last two visits.

HANOI SCORES SAIGON OUSTER OF INDIAN ICC DELEGATION

A 6 October NHAN DAN article scored the Saigon government's refusal to allow the Indian ICC delegation to remain in South Vietnam, and Hanoi media on the 11th took note of the arrival there of the Indian acting chairman of the ICC and reported that he had visited Pham Van Dong. Hanoi's official condemnation of the actions of the Saigon government was voiced in a 12 October statement by the DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman. The statement scored the GVN for refusing to recognize India as the chairman of the ICC, failing to extend the visas of the Indian members of the ICC, and compelling the Indian delegation to leave Saigon. It charged that these actions "are part of the U.S. scheme to negate the role of India as chairman of the ICC and paralyze the ICC and jeopardize its existence." It concluded with the demand that the United States and the Saigon regime "answer for the safety of the ICC and see to it that the latter, in full composition, can work normally in Saigon, where it is headquartered."

North Vietnamese media rarely discuss the ICC and previous comment, as in this case, has been prompted by current developments. Thus, Hanoi's last substantial attention to the international organization was an 11 January 1972 NHAN DAN article which scored the GVN for stating that it no longer agrees to India being ICC Chairman and for refusing to allow the Indian head of the ICC to come to Saigon to assume his duties. The article in January noted that Saigon's actions were prompted by India's decision to elevate its representation in Hanoi to the embassy level, although current Hanoi comment has made no reference to this issue.

Despite the positive attitude toward the ICC reflected in these efforts to back the Indian member, Hanoi has also opposed efforts to establish an active role for the commission. Thus a 25 May 1970 DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement denounced the 16-17 May 1970 Djakarta conference's call for reactivation of the ICC, quoting Sihanouk's assertion at the time that "the United Nations and the ICC definitely have no right to intervene in the internal affairs of the Indochinese peoples, nor do they have the right to control or condemn the struggle" of those peoples.

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MIDDLE EAST

COMMUNIQUE ON SIDQI MOSCOW VISIT INDICATES DISCORD UNRESOLVED

The joint communique issued on 18 October after Egyptian Prime Minister Sidqi's talks with Soviet Premier Kosygin and President Podgornyy on the 16th and 17th indicates that the two sides failed to resolve differences on Middle East policy. The communique says tersely that the two sides "exchanged views on questions of Soviet-Egyptian relations as well as on the Middle East situation" and that the talks passed in an atmosphere of "frankness and mutual understanding," a standard euphemism for lack of agreement. Brief reports on the talks in Soviet media while they were in progress had contained the same cryptic description of the subjects under discussion and had characterized the atmosphere simply as "friendly."

The joint document at the same time puts on record a mutual intention to pursue efforts to settle outstanding differences. It registers at the outset both sides' view that "Soviet-Egyptian friendship is permanent," and it states at the conclusion that "agreement was reiterated" during the talks on the maintenance of contacts between the two countries on questions of mutual interest. It also notes that Brezhnev, Podgornyy, and Kosygin have accepted an invitation tendered on President as-Sadat's behalf to visit Egypt at a date to be agreed upon later.

Following a joint denunciation of recent Israeli "aggression," the Soviet side pledges "also in the future to do all it can to attain the complete withdrawal of Israeli troops from all occupied Arab territories, as well as for defending the legitimate rights of the Arab people of Palestine."* And Egypt expresses its gratitude for the Soviet Union's "great help to the Arab Republic of Egypt in developing its economy, strengthening its military potential, and in other fields of activity." This is the communique's only mention of Soviet military and economic aid to Egypt, although the document notes that Defense Minister Grechko and the chairman of the State Committee of the USSR Council of Ministers for External Economic Relations, S.A. Skachkov, took part in the talks. Egypt's air force commander and minister of economics and foreign trade were among the members of Sidqi's delegation.

* The CPSU Central Committee slogans for the October Revolution anniversary, published in PRAVDA the day before Sidqi arrived in Moscow, contain the first mention of the Palestinian question to appear in Soviet slogans on the Middle East. See the article on the slogans in this TRENDS.

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In a banquet speech on 16 October, which TASS transmitted in full, Sidqi praised Soviet-Egyptian economic cooperation but said it was necessary to discuss questions of further developing "cooperation in other fields." He had come to Moscow, he said, "to discuss the question of how the principles of struggle against imperialism are being implemented."

In his speech at the same banquet, Kosygin reaffirmed support for Egypt on the basis of the Soviet-Egyptian treaty of friendship and cooperation; at the same time responding obliquely to recent criticisms of Soviet Middle East policies by as-Sadat and Cairo newspaper commentators. In his defense of Soviet positions, Kosygin insisted that the USSR does not pursue "selfish interests" in its relations with Egypt and has adhered to the principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of other countries. He "emphatically" rejected "inventions" about "'collusion' with the imperialists concerning a Middle East settlement to the detriment of the interests of the Arab countries." His clearest allusion to the deterioration of relations with Egypt was a remark that "there were many trials for Soviet-Egyptian friendship in the past year." A reference to attempts by "opponents" of Soviet-Egyptian friendship "to scare Arabs with socialism" may have been aimed chiefly at the vocally anticommunist stand of Libyan leader Al-Qadhafi, who reiterated on 7 October his warning that "going too far in friendship with Russia has led to forsaking independence."

Kosygin repeated the Soviet formulation that the Arab countries have the right to fight with "all means" against aggression and expressed support for Egypt's view that "concessions to the aggressor would only encourage him to commit new crimes." Moscow, he said, would continue to do "its utmost to attain full withdrawal of Israel's troops from all occupied Arab lands."

Moscow had exhibited concern not to exacerbate tensions in the two weeks prior to Sidqi's visit by exercising restraint in its reaction to the new critical assessments of Soviet Middle East policy by as-Sadat and Egyptian press commentators. In the only departure from the general silence on these criticisms in Soviet media, an article in the weekly NEW TIMES, quoted by Radio Moscow in Arabic on 14 October, took issue with "certain Arab papers which speak of buyers and sellers of Soviet-Arab friendship." The allusion was to a 7 October article by Ihsan 'Abd al-Quddus, the influential chief editor of the Cairo newspaper AKHBAR AL-YAWM.

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U.S., SOVIET NAVIES

ARTICLE RENEWS BREZHNEV CALL FOR TALKS ON RESTRICTING NAVIES

An article in the October issue of USA: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, IDEOLOGY has revived the proposal made by Brezhnev in his 11 June 1971 speech expressing Soviet readiness to discuss "on an equal basis" proposals for restricting the cruising areas of navies of "the great powers."* The author, military observer B.L. Teplinskiy, cited Brezhnev's proposal at the conclusion of a lengthy review of U.S. naval developments. Asserting that Washington is in the process of reexamining its strategic priorities and is seeking to develop the U.S. Navy into the "primary strike echelon" in its global military strategy, Teplinskiy served notice that "the very trend of this reexamination naturally cannot fail to catch the attention of military specialists in the Soviet Union or to cause an appropriate reaction." In this context, he cited Brezhnev's 1971 proposal and declared that it, together with the SALT agreements, offered "a real escape" from the action-reaction syndrome in weapons development.

Following Brezhnev's 1971 speech, Moscow media gave negligible, low-level attention to the new proposal, focusing in immediate followup comment on the Mediterranean as the area of particular importance and referring on at least one occasion to the Indian Ocean as a possible area of interest. Teplinskiy's article appeared against the background of recent reports in Soviet media, particularly in RED STAR, that the United States intends to develop bases for strategic weapons at such locations as Maddalena Island in the Mediterranean, the Isle of Skye in Scotland, and the Mariana Islands in the Pacific.

IMPLICATIONS FOR SALT Where Teplinskiy's article did not dwell on the implications of the U.S. naval developments for the next round of SALT, an article in the September issue of USA by G.I. Svyatov took the Administration to task for accelerating the reequipment of nuclear submarines with the Poseidon missile and the development of new Trident submarines. Svyatov declared:

* See the TRENDS of 16 June 1971, pages 18-19, for a discussion of Brezhnev's proposal. The TRENDS of 23 June 1971, pages 20-22, reviews minimal followup comment on the proposal in Soviet media.

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Although the letter of the [SALT] agreement does not impose restrictions on a qualitative improvement of strategic weapons systems (within the permitted number of missiles and missile submarines), its spirit is incompatible with a sharp increase in efforts, particularly, to force the development and deployment of the Trident underwater strategic weapons system.

Asserting that Congress had "yielded" to the Pentagon during the debate on the U.S. military budget, Svyatov commented that "the road to the normalization of Soviet-American relations is not through an increase of one or another component of nuclear weapons, but through restricting the arms race both quantitatively and qualitatively in the field of strategic, nuclear, and also ordinary forces." As a means of checking the arms race, Svyatov proposed the application of the principle of equal security to the field of naval weapons development, stating that "the adoption of this principle in the field of general-purpose naval forces could accord with the spirit of the time and promote a relaxation of tensions in international affairs."

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CPSU SLOGANS

CHANGES ON VIETNAM, MIDEAST, DISARMAMENT, DOMESTIC GOALS

There are changes in the definitions of goals to be pursued in Indochina, the Middle East, and disarmament in the current set of the CPSU's semiannual slogans, issued 15 October for the October Revolution anniversary, as compared with the last set issued for May Day. Notable changes in the domestic affairs group seem related to the impact of this year's harvest on economic planning.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS As has been customary over the past several years, two slogans are devoted to Indochina and two to the Middle East--one setting out goals to be sought by "peoples of the world" in the respective area and another saluting, respectively, the Indochinese and Arab peoples. It is in the slogans addressed to "peoples of the world" that the changes occur with respect to both crisis areas:

+ A demand for "an immediate end to the aerial bombardments and shelling of DRV territory," inserted at the beginning of this year's May Day slogan on goals in Indochina, is dropped from the current version (No. 54) of this slogan.* As in October 1970 and in both versions in 1971, the slogan calls simply for "an end to the barbaric war in Indochina and the full and unconditional withdrawal from South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia of all troops of the United States and its satellites." A new concluding call is added: "Freedom and peace to the peoples of Indochina!"

+ The goals to be sought in the Middle East are amended in slogan No. 55. Last spring, peoples of the world were called upon to "strengthen solidarity with the just struggle of the Arab peoples" and "demand an end to Israel's aggression in the Middle East and withdrawal of Israeli troops from the occupied Arab territories." The current version drops the opening call for stronger world solidarity with the Arab peoples, present in this slogan since May Day 1971; however, the separate, unaltered salute to the Arab peoples (No. 56) concludes with the stereotyped "Long live the friendship between the peoples of the Soviet Union and the Arab countries and may it strengthen." The current slogan injects a note of urgency in calling for an "immediate"

* See the Indochina section of this TRENDS for background on the Soviet propaganda pattern.

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end to Israeli aggression, and it adds to the demand for withdrawal of Israeli troops a call for "respect for the rights of the Palestinian Arab peoples"--the first appearance of the Palestinian issue in the slogans. The revamped slogan also concludes with a new phrase, underscoring the quest for a settlement: "Struggle more actively for the establishment of a just and stable peace in this region!"

+ The slogan on disarmament (No. 59) now opens with a call to make nonuse of force "a law of international life" and to strive for a prohibition of nuclear weapons "forever"--reflecting the new Soviet proposal, introduced by Gromyko at the current UN General Assembly session, for an international agreement on nonuse of force and a permanent ban on use of nuclear weapons. This slogan had previously led off with a demand for prohibition of "all types of nuclear and chemical weapons"; there is no mention of chemical weapons in the current slogan, in keeping with the shift of the focus of Moscow comment away from CW this summer as it became apparent that no progress would be made on the issue at the session of the Committee of the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva.

DOMESTIC AFFAIRS Changes in the slogans on domestic affairs indicate a redefinition of economic goals presumably occasioned by this year's disastrous harvest and the resultant need to revise economic plans. The goal of "a substantial increase in the people's welfare," described as the "main task" of the five-year plan at the 24th CPSU Congress and in ensuing editions of the slogans, is now dropped. The currently revised slogan (No. 23) merely calls for "a further upsurge in the socialist economy--the bases of the motherland's might and of the steady growth of the people's prosperity."

In keeping with this change, the traditional goal of "strengthening our motherland's economic and defensive might" is added to the slogan commemorating the 50th anniversary of the formation of the Soviet Union (No. 8), and this revised slogan serves as the centerpiece of PRAVDA's 16 October editorial on the slogans. The appeal to "take the needs of the people more fully into account" is also dropped from the slogan addressed to workers in industry producing consumer goods (No. 26).

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U. S. ELECTION

SOVIET DOMESTIC MEDIA CITE U.S. OPINION POLL FORECASTS

Having steered clear until now of speculation on the outcome of the U.S. presidential election, in line with customary Soviet reticence during American election campaigns, Moscow commentators have informed domestic audiences about forecasts by U.S. public opinion pollsters and political observers that President Nixon will be reelected in November. These forecasts were cited in PRAVDA on 13 October in a dispatch by Washington correspondent Strelnikov, and a similar reference was made two days later by a panelist in the weekly domestic service commentators' roundtable broadcast. Strelnikov ascribed "the Administration's" popularity among voters "primarily to its foreign policy measures," predictably citing the Moscow summit in this connection. Prior, more cautious Soviet comment had cited U.S. observers for the view that Senator McGovern faced a difficult election campaign but had stopped short of airing predictions about the outcome.

The PRAVDA dispatch also went well beyond prior Moscow comment in its treatment of Senator McGovern. Where commentators had previously pointed to "inconsistencies" in his statements on various issues, Strelnikov moved to a harsher portrayal of the Democratic candidate as "maneuvering and changing his tactics in his quest for support." Rendering this judgment on his own authority, Strelnikov added:

There is a grain of truth in the statement made by a rank-and-file voter, a doctor from the city of Edgeworth, Pennsylvania, who recently told a Washington POST correspondent: "It seems to me that the ground is slipping from McGovern's feet. In the primary elections he appeared to us as an honest man, albeit an idealist. But now, under fire from the Republicans, he is frequently changing his positions, adapting them to temporary needs. His appearance has been tarnished; he is the same sort of intriguer as all the others"

Moscow has continued to be more careful in its propaganda for foreign consumption. A summary of the Strelnikov dispatch distributed in TASS' international service left out the reference to the forecasts of the election outcome and did not include the critical remarks on Senator McGovern. Nor has any such comment been noted in Radio Moscow's broadcasts to audiences abroad.

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YUGOSLAVIA

TITO HITS SERBIAN COMMUNIST "INTRIGUES," DEFENDS CRACKDOWN

A conflict between President Tito and Serbian communist leaders was reflected in a hard-hitting speech by the Yugoslav party chief to a Serbian aktiv on 16 October in which he assailed unnamed leaders for "intriguing" behind his back while paying lip service to his policies. Although Tito lashed out at both "rightist" and "leftist" elements in the Serbian party, the brunt of his attack was directed at "extreme leftists" advocating further liberalization and democratization and opposing the present campaign to introduce discipline into the party and give it a larger role in Yugoslav society.

The harsh tone of Tito's address seemed designed to pressure the Serbs to implement his recent letter to all party organizations or face sanctions up to and including expulsion from the party. Although Tito did not name names, his remarks seemed to be aimed chiefly at the president of the Serbian party, Marko Nikezic, and the secretary of the Serbian party Central Committee, Latinka Perovic, both outspoken advocates of liberalism and democratization. As recently as 10 September, in an interview in the Ljubljana daily DELO, Nikezic had defended the need for "democratization" in Yugoslavia. He declared that "one must have a united policy line approved by the masses in order to create unity within the leading bodies"--a principle in opposition to Tito's advocacy of an authoritarian "democratic centralism."

Tito opened his diatribe by rejecting the Serbian aktiv's optimistic assessment that "all is right in Serbia except for a few shortcomings here and there." He characterized the situation in the Serbian party as "unhealthy" and charged the Serbs with "hindering organizations in other republics" by failing to implement federal financial policy in foreign and domestic trade. He also took them to task for failing to control the Belgrade press, which he said was playing up activities by "conservative" forces in other republics while portraying the situation in Serbia as one of "progressive forces waging a struggle for socialist democracy." Noting that each speech during the aktiv session had opened with "a virtual loyalty oath to me," Tito thundered: "I do not need that. Loyalty to League policy is demonstrated by implementing that policy."

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Although Tito defensively insisted that there was no conflict between him and the Serbian party, he nonetheless complained that "there were specific cases when unfavorable and impermissible references were made to me, and not only to me as a person, as a man." Invoking his authority as party leader, Tito reminded his audience that he has been League President since 1937 and that as such he is "responsible for the situation in the entire LCY and in each one of its separate parts." He had ignored criticisms of his policies, he said, until "they became an element of intrigues which could have more extensive political consequences."

In a revealing passage detailing the criticisms being leveled at him personally and at his promised campaign to tighten party discipline, Tito lamented:

I was particularly grieved when stories began to circulate that I was one of those who allegedly wanted to return to the old era, that I am allegedly changing the LCY policy, that I am revising the Ninth Congress decisions and that I am doing this without democratic discussion. Such stories are designed to give the impression that our present joint actions to resolve outstanding problems and remove what is negative in our social life is a modification of our policy and a return to the old.

Answering such allegations, Tito denied that his attempts to make the party more disciplined violate the party statutes. He insisted that the party had never envisioned a situation in which the creation of democratic institutions would absolve the League of its responsibility to act as a political force in Yugoslav society. Maintaining that liberal elements were in effect trying to transform the League into a "discussion club," Tito observed caustically that "not even this role of political leader has been correctly carried out" by the party. It is precisely because of the lack of ideological discipline, he argued, that "we have the phenomenon of factionalism and even that of splitting activity . . . , and we know that such manifestations have come to the surface whenever the workers' party was losing its ideological orientation and its capability for action and when it was losing its ties with the working class."

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In passages carrying ominous overtones for the Serbian leadership, Tito noted that during the aktiv debate "there were many comrades, and I mean leading comrades whom I listened to," who regarded themselves as "immune from such virtues as self-criticism." He went on:

I personally possess a considerable amount of material from the press, speeches, statements, and so on by some leading comrades from the League of Communists of Serbia from which it is clear that there are things and formulations which are contradictory and in which there are both direct and indirect polemics with my--and not only with my--views on various problems. Considering this, I decided not to raise these things because I expected, primarily, that it was certain that there would be comrades who would say this in the form of self-criticism . . . , but that did not happen and that makes me very sad.

Tito left it to the Serbian Central Committee to put its house in order, but with the clear implication that if it did not do so it would face disciplinary action from the League. Warning both the "right" and the "left" against any attempts to use the present campaign to "square accounts," he reiterated his insistence that "the class enemy"--a broadly defined concept in Tito's vocabulary--must be rooted out of both the Serbian and the central party. Drawing attention to the significance of his recent letter to the party organizations, he concluded with the warning: "Do not dare let there be a repetition of the old practice whereby it would merely be read through and then filed away."

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USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS

CULTURAL HARDLINER BECOMES UKRAINIAN IDEOLOGY SECRETARY

A 10 October Ukrainian Central Committee plenum elected V. Yu. Malanchuk Ukrainian Politburo candidate member and ideology secretary replacing F.D. Ovcharenko, who had earlier been criticized for leniency toward Ukrainian literary deviations. Malanchuk, former Ukrainian deputy minister for higher and secondary specialized education, has gained notoriety as a leading spokesman for russification in the Ukraine. However, he was not a member of the Ukrainian Central Committee or even of the Auditing Commission before his present elevation.

Malanchuk's appointment marks a further crackdown on manifestations of Ukrainian nationalism and a reversal of former republic first secretary Shelest's policy of moderation. Shelest had replaced hardliner A.D. Skaba as ideology secretary in 1968 with the more liberal Ovcharenko. Despite the ideological crackdown initiated by Brezhnev in March 1968, Shelest and Ovcharenko appeared to protect Ukrainian writers and even some dissidents from the harsh measures demanded by local leaders, especially in Dnepropetrovsk and Kharkov, and they were implicitly criticized for this at the March 1971 Ukrainian party congress. With the ouster of Shelest last May and the election of Shcherbitskiy as Ukrainian first secretary, Ovcharenko's fall appeared to be imminent.

ADVOCATE OF RUSSIFICATION Malanchuk has a long record of involvement in efforts to suppress Ukrainian nationalism. As head of the Lvov obkom science and culture section and then obkom ideology secretary during the 1960's, he presumably helped organize the 1961, 1965, and 1966 trials of nationalists in Lvov. In 1967 he became Ukrainian deputy minister of higher and specialized secondary education--a sensitive post in view of charges by nationalists that the ministry discriminates against the Ukrainian language in universities and against Ukrainians in admissions to universities.

The role of the ministry in suppressing pro-Ukrainian interpretations of history was detailed in a 29 June 1971 PRAVDA UKRAINY article by Malanchuk. He described how the ministry had forced the rejection of a dissertation because of its "objectivistic" approach to history, and he cited the exposure of Lvov university teachers

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for depicting the Ukrainian past and Ukrainian nationalists in an objective or even favorable light.*

Malanchuk personally responded to these alleged deviations with a long treatise on Ukrainian history published in the Lvov literary journal ZHOVTEN (Nos. 1, 3, 4, 5, 1972). His thoroughly russified interpretation of Ukrainian history featured a series of denials: that any ancient distinction existed between the Ukrainian and Russian peoples; that the Ukraine had historical ties to the West; that Ukrainian society had experienced real democracy and little class strife before joining Russia; that local cadres were not used in the western Ukraine after World War II; and that the Ukraine suffered economic exploitation and discrimination in education and language. Malanchuk also assailed Ukrainian dissident Ivan Dzyuba's 1968 book "Internationalism or Russification?" in the August 1971 issue of QUESTIONS OF CPSU HISTORY. Dzyuba's book had accused him of asserting the superiority of the Russian language.

ADVOCATE OF MODERATION By contrast, Ovcharenko's career has been notable for liberal tendencies, which appear to have earned him the enmity of the powerful Dnepropetrovsk and Kharkov factions. Around 1949, at the age of 36, Ovcharenko rose from head of a laboratory at a Kiev veterinary institute to secretary of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences party committee. He was caught in Moscow's 1951-53 crackdown on Ukrainian scientists for allegedly playing down Russian influence on Ukrainian history and culture. By February 1953 he and other academy leaders were accused of lacking "political sharpness" and of displaying "liberalism" toward "nationalistic distortions in scientific works." His career was probably saved by Stalin's death and the subsequent reversal of nationality policy. Under Ukrainian first secretary Kirichenko, he was promoted to head the Ukrainian Central Committee's science and culture section in 1956.

When former Kharkov leader Podgorny succeeded Kirichenko as republic first secretary in December 1957, Ovcharenko was sent back to academic work as head of a laboratory at the Ukrainian Institute of General and Inorganic Chemistry. Podgorny selected

* For background see the TRENDS of 26 January 1972, pages S2-S5.

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the leader of his Kharkov oblast lecture group, Yu. Yu. Kondufor, as Ovcharenko's replacement and in 1959 chose a longtime protege, Kharkov ideology secretary A.D. Skaba, as Ukrainian ideology secretary.

Ovcharenko's career began to flourish after former Kiev first secretary Shelest succeeded Podgornyy as republic first secretary in 1963. Shelest had come into contact with Ovcharenko while serving as a senior Kiev city official in the early 1950's. In 1964 he chose Ovcharenko for one of the top propaganda posts, chairman of the Ukrainian Znaniye Society; and when he ousted Skaba as ideology secretary in 1968 he turned to Ovcharenko as Skaba's successor.

Shelest apparently differed with Skaba over culture policy and the use of the Ukrainian language. The conflict presumably sharpened with the arrests and trials of Ukrainian dissidents in 1965-66. The arrests and trials, probably ordered by Moscow in connection with the Sinyavskiy-Daniel trial, may have upset Shelest, who took the unusual step of granting an interview to the wife of one of the accused dissidents, promising her an open, fair, and well-publicized trial. The first two trials were indeed partially open, but after they backfired and produced demonstrations for the defendants, the succeeding trials were held in secret. The closed-door trials triggered protests, petitions, and unfavorable publicity when documents exposing them reached the West in early 1968.

Perhaps as a result, Shelest in early 1968 managed to oust the cultural overseers appointed by Podgornyy, ideology secretary Skaba and culture section head Kondufor. Despite the ideological crackdown launched by Brezhnev in March 1968, Shelest and Ovcharenko did not wage a witchhunt against Ukrainian nationalistic writings, although Dnepropetrovsk first secretary Vatchenko and Kharkov first secretary Vashchenko did so in their oblasts.

However, with the weakening of Shelest's position in 1970, his cultural overseers became vulnerable to criticism of leniency toward nationalism. Agitprop chief G.G. Shevel, an associate of Shelest from Kiev, was removed in August 1970. At the March 1971 Ukrainian party congress Vatchenko and Vashchenko assailed the republic ideological leaders for liberalism toward Ukrainian writers, and in May 1971 the liberal writers union leadership was purged. Culture minister R.V. Babiychuk was retired in November 1971, and a wave of arrests of Ukrainian dissidents began in January 1972. With the removal of Shelest as first secretary, Ovcharenko lost his protector. The 10 October plenum which removed him announced that he was again returning to academic work.

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